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ARGUMENT
1.

The District Court Erroneously Granted the State's Motion for Summary
Judgment on Ms. Brown's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
In her opening brief, Ms. Brown demonstrated that the post-conviction court erred

by imputing the knowledge of Ms. Brown's counsel to Ms. Brown and then ruling, based
on this erroneous imputation, that the statute of limitations barred Ms. Brown's
ineffective assistance claim. In response, the State does not dispute that the applicable
statute of limitations begins to run only when the petitioner herself knew or should have
known of evidentiary facts supporting the ineffective assistance claim, not when counsel
knew of the facts. Instead, the State argues that the post-conviction court, in ruling on
summary judgment, did not impute the knowledge of Ms. Brown's counsel to Ms.
Brown. The State also argues that even if the post-conviction court did impute the
knowledge of Ms. Brown's counsel to Ms. Brown, it is irrelevant, because the court
alternatively ruled in denying Ms. Brown's motion to reconsider that Ms. Brown knew or
should have known of the facts giving rise to her claim.
These arguments both fail. The post-conviction court expressly based its summary
judgment ruling on the actual or constructive knowledge of Ms. Brown's counsel
concerning the material facts. Second, material issues of fact concerning whether Ms.
Brown herself knew or should have known of the facts giving rise to her claim precluded
summary judgment.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

(a)

The postconviction court erroneously imputed the knowledge of Ms.
Brown fs counsel to Ms. Brown.

In its Memorandum Decision Re: Motion for Summary Judgment as to Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief, the post-conviction court explicitly concluded that the facts upon
which Ms. Brown's post-conviction claims rested were not newly discovered because her
counsel knew or should have known of those facts.1 For example:
•

Ms. Brown demonstrated that Logan police officers were in possession of reports
from neighbors who heard gunshots at times when Ms. Brown had an alibi. The
post-conviction court found that because "this evidence was known to trial
counsel at the time of trial, it cannot qualify as newly discovered evidence."
PCR.001822.

•

Paulette Nyman, Lael Brown's neighbor, was the only witness who testified that
she heard gun shots at a time consistent with the State's theory. Ms. Brown
presented evidence that Paulette Nyman testified incorrectly at trial and that she
actually heard the shots at a time when Ms. Brown had an alibi. The postconviction court found that Ms. Brown's evidence was "known to trial counsel at
the time of trial, [therefore] it cannot qualify as newly discovered evidence."
PCR.001823.

•

Ms. Brown presented evidence from police files that a blue and white Ford
Bronco was seen at Lael Brown's house at the time of the murder and that this
Bronco belonged to the likely suspect - Bobbie Sheen. The post-conviction court
found that "trial counsel... was aware o f this information or was at least on
"notice" of the information. PCR.001826.

•

Ms. Brown presented evidence from police files showing that the murderer could
easily have entered Lael Brown's house because of a lack of security. The postconviction court found that "the security of Brown's home, or the lack thereof,
was known to trial counsel prior to or at the time of trial and, therefore, is not
newly discovered evidence." PCR.001832.

Ms. Brown's ineffective assistance claim is an alternative claim to her claim of Factual
Innocence. Ms. Brown contends that her counsel did not know the facts upon which her petition
is based. But to the extent Ms. Brown's counsel did have knowledge of these facts, counsel was
ineffective for failing to present these facts to the jury.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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• Ms. Brown demonstrated from internal police notes that the police mishandled
the crime scene. The post-conviction court found that trial counsel could have
discovered these notes "through the exercise of reasonable diligence."
PCR.0001833.
Significantly, the post-conviction court did not hold that Ms. Brown knew or should have
known of the evidence listed above. Rather, as demonstrated by these examples, the
court concluded only that Ms. Brown's counsel knew or should have known of this
evidence. The court then ruled that because Ms. Brown's counsel (not Ms. Brown) knew
or should have known of this evidence, her ineffective assistance of counsel claim was
time barred:
[Ms. Brown's] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial
counsel's failure to present exculpatory evidence that was already known,
or that is based upon the failure of trial counsel to discovery exculpatory
evidence that could have been discovered through the exercise or
reasonable diligence, should have been raised [one year after the deadline
to file a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court].
PCR.001841. In other words, contrary to the State's argument, the post-conviction court
imputed what Ms. Brown's counsel knew or should have known to Ms. Brown, holding
that because Ms. Brown's counsel should have known of this evidence, her claim is time
barred.
The basis of Ms. Brown's ineffective assistance claim is that her trial counsel
failed to discover or present material evidence. If this claim is time barred because trial
counsel failed to exercise reasonable diligence, then a petitioner claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel would never be able to succeed on such a claim. This Court
previously recognized this when it explained that,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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[wjhere a criminal defendant exercises his right to counsel at trial and on
direct appeal, we decline to put the burden on individuals untrained in the
law to discover the errors of those whose assistance whey were
constitutionally guaranteed...
Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62,ffil23-24, 123 P.3d 400. Put differently, as Judge Orme
explained, a habeas petition that accrues on the date of the attorney's "dereliction" will
not be "forthcoming from a prisoner who maintains the same ineffective attorney."
Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). A statute of limitations
that begins to run on the date of the "dereliction" renders the ineffective assistance of
counsel remedy "hollow." IdThe Post-Conviction Remedies Act is consistent with this conclusion. Section
78B-9-107(2)(e) sets out the statute of limitations for an ineffective assistance claim,
providing that the claim accrues "on the date on which petitioner knew or should have
known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition
is based." There is simply no reference to counsel's knowledge.
Here, the post-conviction court erroneously imputed trial counsel's knowledge or
constructive knowledge to Ms. Brown, contrary to the clear language of the statute.
(b)

Disputed issues of fact on the issue of ineffective assistance prevented
summary judgment

In an attempt to avoid the court's rulings on the imputation question, which were
erroneous, the State argues that the post-conviction court changed the grounds on which
it granted summary judgment in its ruling on Ms. Brown's motion to reconsider. The
actual ruling on the motion to reconsider (as opposed to the post-conviction court's dicta
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

during argument) did not disavow any portion of its summary judgment decision. See
PCR.002254:63-70. Instead, the post-conviction court denied the motion to reconsider
on the grounds that even if Ms. Brown did not know the facts underlying her claim, she
could have learned those facts had she exercised reasonable diligence. The postconviction court's ruling in this regard was erroneous because there were disputed issues
of fact concerning what Ms. Brown knew of the police investigation and her lawyers1
conduct. Ms. Brown presented evidence showing that her knowledge was insufficient to
trigger an obligation to conduct further investigation from her jail cell. There were
disputed facts concerning whether she was reasonably diligent in conducting further
investigation.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no disputed issues of
material fact. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The facts and all reasonable inferences that may be
drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Indeed, any showing in support of summary judgment "must preclude all reasonable
possibility that the loser could, if given a trial, produce evidence which would reasonably
sustain a judgment in his favor." Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Cr., 354 P.2d 559, 561
(Utah 1960). In this case, as outlined below, disputed issues of fact predominated and the
post-conviction court erred when, contrary to the legal standard, it resolved those
disputed issues of fact in favor of the State and against Debra Brown.
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First, Ms. Brown showed that her counsel knew or should have known of the
likely perpetrator of the crime - Bobbie Sheen - but failed to present evidence on his
involvement at trial. The post-conviction court found that Ms. Brown knew that Bobbie
Sheen was a likely perpetrator at the time of her trial and knew that her counsel was
ineffective when counsel failed to present evidence of Bobbie Sheen at the criminal trial.
PCR.OOl 825. The post-conviction court, however, disregarded the evidence presented by
Ms. Brown that material facts linking Bobbie Sheen to the murder were unknown to her
until decades after her trial. In the years leading up to her conviction and imprisonment,
all Ms. Brown knew about Bobbie Sheen was that he was an ex-tenant who, like all other
tenants and ex-tenants, was a possible suspect:
Q:

[D]uring the course of the criminal investigation of this case when you
spoke to officers, did you ever discuss Bobby Sheen with any or the
officers?

A:

Actually back when I was interviewed . . . they said did Lael have any
enemies and I said no. And they said, everybody has got enemies,
especially a landlord. That's what made me think of maybe Bobby because
he wasn't too happy with us that day.

Q:

And that's because of the eviction?

A:

Correct.

PCR.2257.-97-98; see also PCR.2270:71-72 (Ms. Brown confirming in her deposition that
she told trial counsel about Bobbie Sheen because he was a disgruntled ex-tenant). Ms.
Brown did not know that at the time of the murder Bobbie Sheen was seen with a gun
that matched the murder weapon and a large amount of cash. Ms. Brown only knew that
Bobbie Sheen was an ex-tenant, and this fact alone was insufficient to put her on notice
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that her counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of Bobbie Sheen's more
significant connection to the crime. Indeed, it was not until she learned years later, after
Sylvan Basset revealed his evidence to post-conviction counsel, that if her trial counsel
knew about Sylvan Basset and did not raise the information at trial, then they were
ineffective:
It was not until my post-conviction counsel asked me to share everything I
knew about Bobbie Sheen that I understood he was important and was
given [an] opportunity to explain the circumstances of his eviction.
PCR.77.
Second, the post-conviction court found that Ms. Brown's trial counsel knew that
Sylvan Bassett had information linking the murder weapon to Bobbie Sheen., The basis
for the court's conclusion on this score was Ms. Brown's recollection that Sylvan Bassett
might have known "something" about the case that could clear her. However, Sylvan
Bassett, in his sworn affidavit, testified that the only person he told about Bobbie Sheen's
connection to the murder was Clara Brown, Lael Brown's ex-wife. Shortly after this
communication, a police officer told Sylvan Basset to keep his mouth shut on the subject
of Bobbie Sheen. PCR.001312 and 001133. Moreover, Ms. Brown's trial counsel
testified unequivocally that he knew nothing about Sylvan Bassett's information linking
Bobbie Sheen to the murder:
Q:
A:

Did you ever learn that Sylvan Bassett had information linking Bobbie
Sheen to Lael Brown's murder?
Never.
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Q:
A:

Did Sylvan Bassett ever tell you that he potentially knew the location of
the murder weapon.
No.

Q:

To this day have you spoken with Sylvan Bassett about Lael Brown's
murder?

A:

No.

PCR.002256: 80.
The facts outlined above demonstrate that whether trial counsel knew about
Sylvan Bassett's information was, at most, a disputed question of fact. Similarly, the
question whether Ms. Brown herself had sufficient notice of Sylvan Bassett's was
disputed.
Third, the record before the post-conviction court presents dispiited issues of fact
concerning whether Ms. Brown knew of the Logan Police Department's inadequate
investigation into this murder. She testified that prior to Rocky Mountain Innocence
Center's review of police records in 2008, she had no "information about the nature of
the police investigation apart from what she was able to see [herjself at the time[.]"
PCR.2257:102. And what Ms. Brown was "able to see for herself was limited because
her attorneys never shared with her any information about the police investigation.
PCR.2257:100-01. For purposes of this argument, we may assume that Ms. Brown's trial
attorneys had access to police documents questioning the time of death, naming Bobbie
Sheen as a suspect, linking Sheen to a vehicle seen at the murder scene, demonstrating
that the murder scene was handled as a suicide, revealing that the scene was handed over
to primary suspects within a days of the murder, revealing that the critical financial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

documents used against Ms. Brown were compiled by those same suspects, and refuting
the claim that the only financial documents missing from Lael Brown's house were the
documents that contained Ms. Brown's forgeries. Even if trial counsel had access to
these documents, Ms. Brown's testimony that this information was not shared with her
creates a disputed issue of fact that precludes summary judgment. Additionally, the fact
that Ms. Brown did not know the facts concerning the shoddy police investigation creates
an issue of fact as to whether she was reasonably diligent in failing to investigate from
her prison cell.
Fourth, Ms. Brown justifiably assumed that her trial counsel was diligent and had
tracked down any leads that would have led to exculpatory evidence. Ms. Brown,
however, did not learn until years later that although a preliminary investigation was
started by an investigator hired by Ms. Brown's first set of attorneys, her trial counsel
never followed up with that investigator to determine what he had done.
PCR.002257:14-15. She learned years later that her trial counsel's normal investigator
was contacted to work on the case, but trial counsel never followed through to direct that
investigator to conduct any investigation. PCR 1898. In sum, Ms. Brown did not know
that her trial counsel had failed to conduct the necessary investigation to uncover material
facts bearing on her innocence. Under these circumstances, the post-conviction court
erroneously concluded that, as a matter of law, Ms. Brown failed to act with reasonable
diligence.
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Q

In sum, disputed issues of fact precluded the post-conviction court's conclusion .
that Ms. Brown knew of the facts underlying her ineffective assistance claim. Disputed
facts also precluded the holding that Ms. Brown knew enough facts to justify a full-scale
investigation from her prison cell. The question whether Ms. Brown, an incarcerated
prisoner with no financial resources, was even capable of conducting this investigation
from her jail cell is an issue of fact that could not properly be decided on summary
judgment.
2

The District Court Erroneously Granted the State's Motion for Summary
Judgment Based on the Inadequacy of the Police Investigation,
The State argues that the post-conviction court correctly concluded that Ms.

Brown's inadequate police investigation claim (the "due process claim") failed because
Ms. Brown's counsel knew or should have known of the basis for the claim, and
therefore, the claim was not based on "newly discovered" evidence. The State's argument
fails for two reasons. First, the statute did not require that Ms. Brown's evidence be
"newly discovered." Second, although certain deficiencies in the police investigation
were evident to Ms. Brown's counsel at the 1995 trial, Ms. Brown presented evidence
creating a disputed issue of fact concerning whether Ms. Brown's counsel knew of the
extent of the inadequacy of the police investigation. The post-conviction court erred in
entering summary judgment in spite of these disputed issues of fact.
First, the State argues that Ms. Brown's due process claim must be based on
"newly discovered evidence." It asserts that evidence is only newly discovered if
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time of trial or
sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or
post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have been discovered through the
exercise of reasonable diligence." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(l)(e)(i). This standard
of "newly discovered evidence," however, is inapplicable to Ms. Brown's due process
claim.
Section 78B-9-104 sets forth six separate grounds for post-conviction relief. The
first ground for relief listed in the statute is that the conviction, as here, was obtained in
violation of the United States and/or Utah constitutions. See § 78B-9-104(1 )(a). This
ground for relief has no newly discovered evidence requirement. In fact, only one of the
six grounds spelled out in section 78B-9-104 has a newly discovered evidence
requirement. See § 78B-9-104(l)(e) (setting forth the requirements for a claim that no
reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty in light of the newly
discovered evidence). The otherfivegrounds, by their express terms, do not include a
newly discovered evidence requirement. See § 78B-9-104(l)(a), (b), (c), (d) and (f).
Instead, the PCRA merely requires that these claims be brought within one year of the
date when the petitioner (not her counsel) knew or should have known of the factual basis
of her claim. See § 78B-9-107.
The one-year statute of limitations is materially different from the "newly
discovered evidence" requirement of section 78B-9-104(e). The statute of limitations
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standard is whether the petitioner knew or should have known; the newly discovered
evidence standard is whether the petitioner or her counsel knew or should have known.
This highlights the most important point: the due process claim is not necessarily barred
if counsel knew of the evidence supporting the claim. The claim is only barred if the
petitioner failed to bring the claim within one year of the date when the petitioner (as
opposed to counsel) learned or should have learned of the evidence underlying her claim.
Here, the post-conviction court granted summary judgment on the due process
claim on the ground that Ms. Brown's trial counsel knew or "with the exercise of
reasonable diligence" could have discovered the factual basis of Ms. Brown's due
process claim. PCR.001836. This was error. A claim is not necessarily barred because
trial counsel knew or should have known of the facts giving rise to the due process claim.
Instead, the claim is barred only if Ms. Brown knew or should have known, and the trial
court made no findings concerning what Ms. Brown knew or should have known.
PCR.001836. Since the post-conviction court's ruling was unsupported by the necessary
factual findings, it should be reversed.
Second, even if Ms. Brown's claims could be barred because her trial counsel
knew or should have known of the facts underlying her claim, there are disputed issues of
fact concerning what Ms. Brown's counsel knew concerning the inadequate police
investigation. For instance, internal police notes show that the Logan Police Department
failed to preserve critical financial information before turning Lael Brown's house over to
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

some of its prime suspects - members of Lael Brown's family - who then cleaned out
the house.3 It is undisputed that these internal police notes (which were not bates labeled)
were not disclosed to Ms. Brown until 2008. See PCR.001278-1279; PCR.002255:73-74
(identifying the internal police notes as documents obtained in 2008). The postconviction court, however, held that this evidence was not newly discovered based on the
factual assumption that trial counsel could have discovered this evidence had it simply
asked for it. PCR.001833-001834. This assumption required the trial court to disregard
the fact that these documents were never bates labeled, and therefore, the information
disclosed therein was not released to trial counsel along with the other discovery
materials that trial counsel asked for. In other words, the post-conviction court
disregarded the factual dispute concerning when this information was or could have been
obtained by trial counsel. The post-conviction court construed the facts and the
inferences in favor of the State, when those facts and inferences must be "viewed in the
light most favorable to" Ms. Brown.4

2

See P.CR.001379 (discussing a polygraph of Lael Brown's son); PCR.001381 (discussing the
alibis of Lael Brown's grandson and noting that the medical examiner thought the suspect
"would be a family member").
3
See PCR.001379 ("family will be cleaning out the house today").
4
Importantly, the failure to preserve the financial evidence led to false evidence being presented
at trial. At the criminal trial, the prosecution called Lael Brown's son to testify that the only
bank statement missing was the October bank statement. Two pieces of newly discovered
evidence shows that this testimony was untrue. First, Detective Ridler testified in his deposition
during the post-conviction proceedings that other bank statements were missing. PCR.001466001463. Moreover, a previously unreleased police document corroborates Detective Ridler's
testimony. PCR.002255:83-84.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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13

Further, the record before the post-conviction court discloses newly discovered
evidence demonstrating that the police failed to investigate the likely suspect of the
murder, Bobbie Sheen. At least two sources, Warren Brown and Sylvan Bassett,
specifically identified Bobbie Sheen as the likely murderer. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, tabs
42 and 43. There is no evidence in the police file, however, that Bobbie Sheen was ever
investigated by the police. PCR.002255:184-187 (police received tips that Bobbie Sheen
was a suspect but never interviewed him). The record also raised a disputed issue as to
whether trial counsel knew or should have known of the police's information concerning
Bobbie Sheen's connection to this crime. On that score, Ms. Brown's trial counsel
testified that he never saw the police documents identifying Bobbie Sheen as a suspect.
PCR.002256:78. Sylvan Bassett testified that the police not only failed to investigate his
information, but that the police affirmatively suppressed the information. PCR.0013123.
And Ms. Brown's counsel testified that he never learned of Mr. Bassett1 s evidence.
We respectfully submit tl u it the "evidence" that the trial court relied upon in
holding that trial counsel knew of Bobbie Sheen's connection to the crime was not
evidence at all. The post-conviction court noted that the police documents disclosing
Bob Sheen's name were bates labeled and were therefore "available" to trial counsel in
1995. The State, however, never presented any evidence that, in fact, the bates-labeled
documents were produced to Ms. Brown's counsel. In other words, the State presented
no testimony that these specific bates labeled documents were produced to Ms. Brown's
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counsel. Instead, the post-conviction court inferred that the documents must have been
produced because some were bates-labeled. PCR.001824. In sum, not only did the court
resolve a factual dispute in favor of the State, it did so without an evidentiary basis and in
spite of Ms. Brown's evidence that the documents were not disclosed at the time of the
criminal trial.
The record before the post-conviction court established, at a minimum, a prima
facie due process claim. In addition to the failure of the police to secure critical financial
information, the failure of the police to investigate a likely suspect, and the police's
affirmative efforts to suppress Mr. Bassett's information, the police completely failed to
gather critical physical evidence. When officers arrived at the murder scene, they
discovered Lael Brown in bed with three gunshot wounds to his head - an obvious
homicide. Nonetheless, officers acted on a suicide hunch. Based on that hunch, they
materially compromised the crime scene. They lifted bed sheets and blankets, rolled the
body, stepped onto the bed, tracked through the blood, and reached over and around the
body searching for the suicide weapon. PCR.001517. Although police investigators
agreed that Lael Brown's killer must have been was covered in blood and that the
murderer's bloody handprint wasfoundon the front door, police failed to even
photograph this evidence. PCR. 1500-1501. Since no physical evidence linked Ms.
Brown to the murder, the physical evidence the police failed to gather was all the more
critical.
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There is no basis for the post-conviction court's summary judgment ruling, and it
should be reversed. There are disputed issues of material fact concerning when Ms.
Brown or her counsel learned the critical facts underlying her due process claim. Those
critical facts combined with the other evidence provided a sufficient basis for Ms.
Brown's claim to survive summary judgment.
3.

The District Court Erroneously Granted the State?s Motion for Summary
Judgment Based on the Unreasonableness of the Jury's Verdict.
It is not the "purpose of the summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility

of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of the evidence. Neither is it to
deny parties the right to a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact." Holbrook Co. v.
Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 183 (Utah 1975). The record presented by the movant "must
preclude all reasonable possibility that the loser could, if given a trial, produce evidence
which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor." Bullock v., Deseret Dodge
Truck Ctr., 354 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah 1960). As outlined throughout this memorandum
and in Ms. Brown's opening memorandum, numerous issues of fact concerning whether
the factual basis of Ms. Brown's claim was newly discovered or not precluded summary
judgment, and the post-conviction court's ruling denied the "parties the right to a trial to
resolve [those] disputed issues of fact."
The court's ruling on Ms. Brown's Factual Innocence claim demonstrates the most
important point on this score: given the opportunity to present her evidence at trial, Ms.
Brown would have prevailed on her claim that, in light of the newly discovered evidence,
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no reasonable jury would have found her guilty. The post-conviction court held that the
burden of proving actual innocence is higher than the petitioner's burden under the
PCRA. PCR.002104. Because Ms. Brown met the higher burden of proving her
innocence by clear and convincing evidence, Ms. Brown necessarily met the lower
burden of proving that no reasonable jury could have found her guilty. The postconviction court, however, prevented Ms. Brown from fully presenting her claim by
disregarding the significant factual disputes highlighted by the pages of briefing
submitted by both parties to this Court citing conflicting evidence and conflicting
interpretations of that evidence. The post-conviction court erred when it resolved these
disputed factual issues in favor of the State and deprived Ms. Brown of her right to
present what the trial court necessarily held to be a valid claim for post-conviction relief.
4.

The PCRA's One-Year Statute of Limitations is Unconstitutional.
Contrary to the State's interpretation of arguments presented in Ms. Birown's

opening brief, she does not argue that the Court must apply an "interests of justice
exception" to the PCRA. Rather, Ms. Brown argues that the PCRA's one-year statute of
limitations violates article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution (the "open courts
provision") because it does not provide an "escape valve" that is sufficiently similar to
the interests of justice exception. In other words, the PCRA's one-year statute of
limitations fails to provide a constitutionally-required exception under which a court may
consider the relative interests of the parties. As it has done in other cases, this Court
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should strike the one-year statute of limitations as unconstitutional under the open courts
provision.
The State's opposition suffers from three significant flaws. First, the State
incorrectly argues that the Court must presume that the PCRA's statute of limitations is
constitutional. Second, the State incorrectly argues that the Utah Constitution does not
require an exception similar to the in the interests of justice exception. On this score, the
State relies on authority interpreting constitutional provisions not raised by Ms. Brown,
and attempts to classify decades of relevant authority as nothing more than dicta. Finally,
the State argues that when this Court adopted Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C, this
Court ruled that all procedural provisions of the PCRA, including the statute of
limitations, are constitutional. As demonstrated below, each argument fails to directly
address, let alone refute, the established standard for analyzing constitutional challenges
under the open courts provision. As argued in Ms. Brown's opening brief, the PCRA's
statute of limitations violates the open courts provision because it provides no
discretionary exception to its rigid one-year requirement.
(a)

The PCRA's One- Year Statute of Limitations Is Not Presumed
Constitutional.

Unlike most other constitutional challenges, when a "statute of limitations impacts
the constitutional right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which as a civil remedy is
protected under [the open courts provision], the usual presumption of validity does not
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control [the court's] review of [the] statute."5 Currier v. Holder 862 P.2d 1357, 1362
(UtahCt.App. 1993).
Without citing a single case supporting its position, the State contends that the
Court must presume that the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations is constitutional.
State's Br. at 49-50. In fact, most cases cited by the State do not involve a constitutional
challenge under the open courts provision or even the right to petition for habeas corpus.
State v. Angilau, 2011 UT 3, <| 7, 245 P.3d 745 (challenging Utah's automatic waiver
statute as unconstitutional under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution); Jones v. Utah Bd. of
Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53, % 8, 94 P.3d 283 (challenging the constitutionality of a
statute granting the parole board authority to issue warrants under the principle of
separation of powers, article VII, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, the Fourth
Amendment of the United State Constitution, and article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution); State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, U 18, 993 P.2d 854 (challenging Utah's
statutory limitations on the insanity defense as unconstitutional under article I, section 9
of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution). Currier makes clear that a statute affecting a right protected by the
open courts provision, such as the right to petition for habeas corpus, is not subject to the

5

The "writ of habeas corpus has, over the years, absorbed the post-conviction relief remedy to
form a single constitutional remedy." Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1989). Here,
the petitioner filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act.
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same presumption generally granted in challenges against other provisions. 862 P.2d at
1362.
The State advances two cases that address the constitutionality of a statute of
limitations under the open courts provision, but neither supports its position. See Berry
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985); Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop,
2004 UT App 436, 104 P.3d 646. Colosimo did not discuss or mention whether the
presumption applies, and Berry reinforced the standard set forth in Currier. In Berry, this
Court held that the presumption of constitutionality does not apply to challenges under
the open courts provision because "[t]hat kind of analysis would result in the legislative
power prevailing in every case, and would deprive the constitutional rights embraced in
section 11 of any meaningful content or force." Berry, 717 P.2d at 678-79.
The Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Currier sets forth the appropriate analysis
for a constitutional challenge under the open courts. The State has presented no authority
to suggest the Court should deviate from this established standard.
(b)

The PCRA 's One-Year Statute of Limitations is Unreasonably Inflexible Under
the Open Courts Provision Because it Provides Nothing More Than a Strict
Time-Based Limitation.

This Court has made clear that "the mere passage of time can never justify
continued imprisonment of one who has been deprived of fundamental rights." Julian v.
State, 966 P.2d 249, 254 (Utah 1998) (emphasis in original). The open courts provision
provides:
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All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel,
any civil cause to which he is a party.
'The open courts provision guarantees access to the courts and a judicial
procedure that is based on fairness and equality, and prevents arbitrary deprivation of
effective remedies designed to protect basic individual rights." Currier v. Holden, 862
P.2d 1357, 1361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The critical question in an analysis under the
open courts provision is "whether [the challenged] legislative enactment denies a litigant
'a remedy by due course of law.'" Id. (citation omitted). If the legislative enactment
abrogates an existing remedy, and no alternative remedy is provided, the statute is only
valid under the open courts provision if it eliminates a clear social or economic evil
through means that are not unreasonable or arbitrary. Id. To make this determination,
the court must weigh whether abrogation of the remedy or cause of action is justified by
the statute's "elimination of a clear economic or social evil through reasonable and nonarbitrary means." Id at 1365. "[T]he purpose of the open courts clause [i]s to 'impose
some limitation' on the legislature's 'great latitude in defining, changing, and
modernizing the law.'" Craftsman Builder's Supply v. Butler Mfg., 1999 UT 18, U 15,
974 P.2d 1194 (quoting Berry, 717 P.2d at 676).
The PCRA does not provide an alternative remedy after the expiration of its
statute of limitations. The PCRA's one-year statute of limitations therefore violates the
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open courts provision because its strict temporal requirement is too rigid compared the
alleged "evil" it is meant to prevent. In her opening brief, Ms. Brown explained at length
that the Legislature's interests in finality, in reducing repeat petitions, and in precluding
stale evidence are insufficient to overcome the interests of an imprisoned individual "who
may have actually done nothing more than miss a deadline." Op. Br. at 62-65. In
response, the State ignores the analytical framework of the open courts provision and
instead attempts to analogize to authority interpreting other constitutional provisions.
The State first cites Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, 234 P.3d 1115, for the
proposition that "this Court has not constitutionalized the 'interests of justice' exception."
State's Br. at 51. This argument suffers from two flaws. First, it does not respond to Ms.
Brown's argument. She does not argue that this Court has already read an interests of
justice exception into the PCRA. Ms. Brown's position is that without some similarly
flexible mechanism, the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations violates the open courts
provision. The argument's second flaw is that Gardner involved a challenge under the
jurisdiction clause, not the open courts provision. 2010 UT 46,fflf93-93. This Court's
analysis in Gardner is therefore not relevant to Ms. Brown's challenge in the instant
case.6

6

Even if Gardner were somehow relevant, this Court never actually reached the issue of
whether, or to what extent, Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution grants this Court
authority to judicially impose a common law exception to the PCRA's one-year statute of
limitations. 2010 UT 46,ffi[93-94.
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The State also, argues that the PCRA's statute of limitations is constitutional,
notwithstanding the absence of any merits-based exception, because federal courts have
upheld a similar statute of limitations contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (the "AEDPA"). States Br. at 58. This argument is equally unavailing.
Most notably, the United States Constitution does not contain an equivalent open courts
provision. Absent an analogous provision, federal precedent does little to resolve this
state law issue. In the example cited by the State, Hill v. Dailey, the petitioner based his
challenge to the AEDPA statute of limitations on the Suspension Clause (article I,
Section 9, clause 2) and the Petition Clause of the First Amendment. 557 F.3d 437,43839 (6th Cir. 2009).7
In the remainder of its opposition, the State simply labels Mr. Brown's authority
"dicta" without offering any alternative authority to affirmatively support its own
position.8 State's Br. at 52-54. Even if the language cited by Debra Brown were dicta,
which it is not, Manning, Julian, Frausto, Currier, Hurst, and Brown set forth a clear,
Federal claims under the Petition Clause are distinct from claims under the open courts
provision. They are similar in the sense that both are meant to preserve an opportunity to seek
judicial relief. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414-15 (2002). However, quite
different from Utah's open courts analysis, the federal standard requires "(1) a nonfrivolous,
arguable underlying claim, whether anticipated or lost; (2) the official acts frustrating the
litigation; and (3) a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise
available in a future suit" Neaves v. City of San Diego, 70 Fed. Appx 428, 430 (9th Cir. 2003)
(citing Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415). In light of these differences, interpretations of the Petition
Clause are not instructive.
8
The State notes that the Utah Court of Appeals interpreted this Court's language in Julian to be
dicta. State's Br. at 53. However, in that same opinion, the Court of Appeals held that "the trial
court did err by dismissing the petition without fully considering the interests of justice exception
. . . . " Swart v. State, 1999 UT App 96, If 4, 976 P.2d 100 (citing Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849,
851 (Utah 1998)).
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consistent standard to apply in an open courts provision analysis: a statute of limitations
that impacts a personal liberty violates the open courts provision where the statute lacks
any discretionary procedure by which a court can weigh the equities in a particular case.
See Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, If 16 n.4, 89 P.3d 196; Julian, 966 P.2d at 254
("[T]he mere passage of time can never justify continued imprisonment of one who has
been deprived of fundamental rights." ... Accordingly, "no statute of limitations [lacking
an interests of justice exception] may be constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition."
(emphasis in original).); Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998) (court "must always
consider the 'interests of justice' exception . . . when a petitioner raises meritorious
claims"); Currier, 862 P.2d at 1372 (holding that there is "no legitimate governmental
interest in keeping a person in prison who may actually have done nothing more than
miss [a] deadline .. . "); Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035 (Utah 1989) ("howsoever
desirable it may be to adhere to the rules, the law should not be so blind and unreasoning
that where an injustice has resulted the [defendant] should be without remedy"); Brown
v. Turner, 440 P.2d 1029, 1035 (Utah 1989) (it was "unconscionable not to re-examine"
the untimely petition).
This enduring line of precedent leaves little question that a statute of limitations is
unconstitutionally inflexible where it imposes a strict time-bar on a claim that could
otherwise free a wrongly imprisoned person.
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.'.(e):

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C Does Not Establish the
Constitutionality of the One-Year Statute of Limitations.

This Court's adoption of the current version of Rule 65C was not an endorsement
of the PCRA's constitutionality. This Court does not decide issues through the exercise
of its authority to adopt rules of procedure and rules of evidence under article VIII,
section 4 of the Utah Constitution. To the contrary, this Court has held the following
requirements must be met "to sustain an action: a justiciable controversy based upon an
accrued set of facts, an actual conflict, adverse parties, a legally protectable interest on *
the plaintiffs part, and an issue ripe for judicial resolution. Barnard v. Utah State Bar,
857 P.2d 917, 919 (Utah 1993) (citing Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah
1983)). These elements are not present where the Court adopts procedural rules.
Beyond the fact that Utah courts do not establish precedent through the adoption
of recommended rules, it is illogical to presume that adoption of a single rule means that
this Court has analyzed the constitutionality of each provision contained in the underlying
statute. Such a presumption would also assume that this Court will revise or at minimum
re-analyze Rule 65C each time the Legislature amends the PCRA. This is unlikely to be
the case.
Finally, the State relies heavily on the language contained in the advisory
committee notes to Rule 65C. As this Court has acknowledged, however, advisory
committee notes are not authoritative, and moreover, the Court "does not formally
endorse them." Burns v. Bovden, 2006 UT 14, % 16 n.6, 133 P.3d 370 (acknowledging

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

is

that advisory committee notes hold some persuasive value) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
The argument that the Court's adoption of Rule 65C represents an endorsement of
the constitutionality of the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations fails to consider the
jurisdiction of the courts, the practicalities of rulemaking, and the limited authority
granted to advisory committees.
CONCLUSION
If the Court upholds the trial court's Factual Innocence ruling, then the Court need
not address the errors of the trial court's summary judgment ruling. However, if the
Court reaches the issues presented by Ms. Brown concerning the trial court's summary
judgment ruling, that ruling should be reversed.
DATED this 16th day of July, 2012.
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